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A Brave New British Citizenry? Reconceptualising the Acquisition of British Citizenship 
by Children 




This article identifies children’s rights as a neglected area in citizenship literature; both in socio-
legal scholarship, and in British nationality case law. It analyses reasons for this neglect and 
posits that there exists a dichotomy in approaches to the wellbeing of children in the UK. The 
characterisation of children’s interests and subsequent obligations owed by states to children 
are different in nationality law from other areas of law, notably, family law. Through our case 
study of the registration of children as British citizens, we argue that in the UK formal legal 
membership may appear achievable ‘in the books’ but remains elusive in ‘law in action’. 
Children’s interests should be just as central to citizenship studies and nationality case law as 
to family law cases. A new approach to acquisition of British citizenship by children, with the 
best interests of the child as a critical evaluative principle at the heart of decision-making, will 
usher in a new era. In the absence of such reconceptualization, children remain passive 
subjects of nationality law, and their voices are unheard in processes of acquisition of 




17-year-old Jake has lived in the UK from when he was eight years old and attended 
school in London from Year 3. An outstanding student with A*A A results in Maths and 
Science subjects, Jake has three university offers to read Physics. His parents came to 
England from Ghana, and do not have indefinite leave to remain. His father was an 
‘overstayer’ a few years back. Jake’s parents approached an immigration lawyer to 
prepare an application for registration as a citizen at the discretion of the Home 
Secretary for Jake but they have been told that they should wait a couple of years and 
then seek naturalisation instead, as his father’s lack of settled status may adversely 
affect the outcome of the discretionary registration application. Nobody has consulted 
Jake about his citizenship requirements or plans for his future. Meanwhile, without a 
secure legal status, Jake is not eligible for student loans. He has to pay higher foreign 
student fees. Without loans, his parents will be unable to support his university 
education.  
 
Jake’s story is not an isolated one. Many young people are still unable to afford university 
education solely because of their lack of full British nationality or secure immigration status, 
despite living nearly all their lives in Britain. Like Jake, many have no other national identity 
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other than their British identity as they have grown up socially and culturally British. Yet legally, 
they lack the status and rights associated with settled immigration status. Since the children 
remain unaware of their status until they are applying for loans to fund their university 
education they are usually 17 or about to turn 18 when they apply for citizenship. However, 
their sense of identity and belonging is shaped by their long presence as children. In a recent 
case, (Tigere [2015] UKSC 57), the UK Supreme Court has declared this situation to be 
discriminatory when it takes into account the ‘settled’ status of children, as many children who 
do not have ‘settlement’ are unable to exercise their right to education merely because of their 
national origin. Despite this judgment, however, there has been little action taken to clarify the 
law and the plight of children like Jake remains uncertain. 
 In the UK, the British Nationality Act provides a pathway for regularization through the 
Home Secretary’s discretionary power to register children. For Jake and others like him, 
however the situation in practice is far from satisfactory. Discretion is rarely exercised in their 
favour.  Thus, although the legal power exists, the British situation highlights the need to think 
beyond legal capacity on paper and to ensure that legal capabilities are real and robust. In a 
comparable situation, the US lacks the formal legislation which gives children legal capacity as 
American citizens. Instead, the challenge there is to put appropriate legislation in place. 
Proposed federal legislation - the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors 
(DREAM) Act - aims to fill this gap and facilitate formal legal membership (citizenship or other 
secure immigration status) for young persons without secure legal status. But as we shall see, 
like the American DREAMers, British children like Jake and the Tigere applicants fall through 
the cracks in the legal system. We argue that by placing the best interests of children at the 
heart of nationality and citizenship issues, just as in other areas of law involving children, the 
wellbeing of long term resident children can be safeguarded.  As unaccompanied migrant 
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children arrive and settle in the UK from conflict areas in the Middle East the issues we address 
in this article will acquire even greater salience for a large group of children residing in the UK.   
We draw from a variety of qualitative data to construct and evidence our argument in 
this paper. We first present some of the specific issues pertinent to the registration of children 
as British citizens before analysing the implications of the issues for citizenship theory as a 
whole. We then suggest an alternative framework for nationality principles for children. 
Invisible Children 
 
Conceptions of citizenship so far have not fully included children. Perhaps this is 
because children are seen as subjects to be protected and preserved rather than as active 
participants in society (Nakata 2015). Not usually being part of the work force, they are 
economically dependent, and they lack the ability to participate politically especially when they 
are without citizenship status (Nolan 2013; Lister, 2008). This leads to their interests being 
largely overlooked in legal policy making, except when they become troublemakers (such as 
when they are juvenile offenders) or victims, for example as victims of abuse (e.g., Marsh et 
al., 2001; Coltrane and Adams, 2003). In other everyday situations, when they are neither the 
troublemaker nor the victim, they are overlooked. Yet, they are participants in society who 
engage with others while exercising citizenship rights and carrying out citizenship duties. 
Writing about children’s citizenship rights, Cockburn says in his book Rethinking Citizenship 
Rights, ‘both adults and children are socially inter-dependent’ through citizens’ simultaneous 
‘responsibilities and duties’ (1998b, p. 113). This inter-dependent approach to children in 
society is missing from their nationality cases. 
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    In society children engage with others at various levels of permissible interaction. Hart’s 
‘ladder of participation’ distinguishes different levels at which children are permitted active 
social participation. Some of these facilitate participation in theory while denying it in actual 
practice (Hart, 1997). For example, at the lower rungs, children’s participation may be reduced 
to manipulation, decoration or tokenism, meaning they are used in one way or another for 
adults’ own social or political ends. At the higher rungs, however, children can gain increasingly 
powerful levels of participation through being informed, consulted, taking initiative and, 
highest of all, sharing in actual decision making (Hart, 1997). At present in British citizenship 
applications, the participation level of children is only at the lowest rung. The agency of 
children to act on their own behalf is limited as their capacity to be able to decide on whether 
they choose to become British citizens is often questioned. We suggest in this paper that 
children’s participation should be at the levels where they can meaningfully make themselves 
be heard and have their interests fully considered in the citizenship processes. We submit that 
this can be achieved through a thorough consideration of their best interests in nationality 
proceedings, as is already the norm in family law proceedings.  
Our arguments resonate with existing literature in family studies and models of 
children’s participatory rights under Article 12 of the UNCRC (for e.g. Lundy 2007 with respect 
to Article 12 UNCRC and children; Eekelaar 2015, Fernando 2014). But citizenship studies 
literature is mostly silent on the critical aspects of the legal dimensions of children’s citizenship 
rights (with a few exceptions such as Thronson 2006, Piper 2008a and b and Stalford 2000).  
The bulk of legal writing on children’s citizenship is practice oriented, for e.g., about the general 
rules of acquisition: gaining citizenship by birth, acquiring citizenship through blood links, and 
how far citizenship, once obtained, can be transmitted inter-generationally. How children 
acquire citizenship and the standards they are required to satisfy in order to obtain citizenship 
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are rarely evaluated from a critical perspective. Sometimes discussions about children can be 
found in works on nationality law but these are mostly afterthoughts in discussions of the 
processes for, and rights of, adults.  There is seldom any analysis of the everyday experiences 
of children or their links with society. In the rare instances, when children are discussed in 
relation to their wider role in society, they are projected as ‘citizens in the making’ rather than 
as full-fledged citizens in their own right (Moosa-Mitha, 2005). They are considered secondary 
to the world of adult politics or simply located outside the political field (Kallio and Häkli, 2011). 
From these viewpoints, it is difficult to obtain critical reflections on how far children’s 
citizenship rights are engaged or, indeed, actualised.  
Another shortcoming is that different pieces of literature on citizenship and children’s 
rights seldom engage each other. For instance, Freeman (1998) and Mayall (2000, 2003) have 
noted a lack of communication between the sociology of childhood literature and writings on 
children’s rights. To some extent the modern children’s rights movement is being studied by 
sociologists interested in childhood but it does not yet form part of wider law and society 
literature. While American scholars have started writing about the role of children in the 
DREAM Act movement (for example Keyes 2014) the gap between formal nationality law and 
nationality legal practice has not been noted in mainstream research in the field of children’s 
rights.   
Our case study seeks to transcend disciplinary boundaries to demonstrate how children 
who identify with a particular nationality and ‘belong’ to a society may still be excluded from 
participation as citizens. Despite facially inclusive provisions of law, our case study indicates 
that routine exclusion takes place without any serious consideration of children’s wellbeing.  
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Socio-legal Lens of Rights, Status, Identity  
 
As children are situated within multiple power relationships that exist in society -family, 
educational institutions, and wider communities - it may be expected that their citizenship 
rights be responsive to societal needs and influences (Alanen, 2010; Cockburn, 1998a). Thus, 
we submit that looking at children’s citizenship rights socio-legally is of critical importance and 
to this end, we undertake a socio-legal analysis of how children acquire British citizenship 
through the processes of registration.  
Joppke’s analytical triumvirate of status, identity and rights as constituents of 
citizenship explain various dimensions of children’s citizenship (2010). Status is limited in the 
sense that it is a narrow legal construction. Identity, on the other hand, is overbroad as it could 
mean a sense of belonging to any institution, not just to a nation state.  Rights are generally 
highly individualistic in nature.  Taken together as a triad, however these concepts are  
particularly apt for understanding children’s citizenship as children readily imbibe identity in 
their formative years even while they may lack commensurate legal status as citizens. 
Sometimes they may belong socially in the community in which they reside but may also 
simultaneously lack legal membership in the country of which they are resident. Further, while 
children may enjoy the protection of rights in the law in the books (such as through the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and related domestic legislation) they often lack 
the ability to enjoy the rights in practice because of lack of formal legal membership. Those 
who acquire social identity as British citizens may neither gain the legal status of citizenship, 
nor the rights associated with citizenship, such as a right to further and ongoing education.   
In order to test how the legal framework with respect to the pathways to citizenship 
works out in actual practice we have selected as our case study the registration of children as 
7 
 
British citizens. In theory, British legal provisions are inclusive ones as the Home Secretary has 
wide powers to register children as citizens.  The provisions need to be assessed, however, in 
actual operation and within the context of immigration law more broadly. In the UK, nationality 
provisions operate in tandem with the selective and exclusionary practices of immigration 
control so there is always an element of selection and exclusion (Tyler 2010). The focus on 
immigration control means that citizenship has not been at the forefront of nationality laws in 
the UK.  
The Context for British Citizenship of Children 
 
Fransman (2011) and Dummett and Nicol (1990) explain that little attention has been 
given to British citizenship in nationality laws owing to the historical privileging of 
‘subjecthood’. Until the British Nationality Act of 1981 British citizenship did not exist in a 
defined form in law. This is due to the political context of colonization and the birth of the 
Commonwealth. The 1948 Commonwealth and Nationality Act had designated the population 
of Britain as ‘subjects of the Crown’ and defined the relationship as ‘citizenship of the United 
Kingdom and colonies’ (Lester, 2008). Yet, this was also the designation of all the subject 
populations of the British Empire that chose to be a member of the Commonwealth (e.g., 
India). It was this status of ‘subjects of the Crown’ that enabled people from all over the Empire 
and, later, the Commonwealth, to freely enter Britain and enjoy the same legal status as the 
other British residents in the country.  
Subjecthood emphasises the vertical relationship between subject and sovereign 
rather than the horizontal relationship between citizens. The subject–sovereign relationship is 
of allegiance and protection rather than of rights or identity. It is specifically configured around 
the adult loyal male who would have contributed to the war efforts and obtained the 
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protection of the sovereign in exchange. This vision obviously did not include children who 
were generally not engaged in warfare. It was only after the two World Wars that citizenship 
literature began to grapple with the rights of citizens. An even more recent core concept of 
citizenship is that of ‘belonging’ in a society.  
After the breakdown of the Empire and the proliferation of the Commonwealth, 
immigration controls came in and the British legal regime changed drastically (Karatani, 2003). 
Free movement of former colonial subjects was restricted. When immigration control became 
the focus of nationality laws, pure jus soli (birth citizenship) rules also changed. Thus, the 
introduction of the British Nationality Act 1981 meant that for the first time, people who had 
been born in the United Kingdom were not automatically entitled to British citizenship. From 
then on citizenship became based on having a ‘close personal connection with the United 
Kingdom’ (see, White Paper British Nationality Law: Outline of Proposed Legislation, presented 
July 1980). The Standing Committee for the British Nationality Bill, however, explored the 
importance of registering children whose parents were ‘settled’ in the UK. It said: ‘it is the 
Government’s view that it is in the interests of good race relations in this country that children 
born to settled parents should be British Citizens.’(HC/OF/SC/229 Hansard: Vol. V – Standing 
Committees F & G 1980/1981, col 177). ‘Settled’ in this context meant having a secure long-
term status such as Indefinite Leave to Remain or full citizenship. This was because: ‘We believe 
that it is extremely important that those who grow up in this country should have as strong a 
sense of security as possible.’ (19 HC/OF/SC/229 Hansard: Vol. V – Standing Committees F & G 
1980/1981, col 177). Different pathways became available after 1981, most significantly 
naturalisation and two forms of registration (by entitlement and by discretion).  
Marshall identified three major groups of rights associated with citizenship: civil, 
political and social in post-war Britain (1950). The civil and political rights concerning voting 
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and democratic participation did not apply to children. Marshall’s exposition on the social 
element of citizenship included a variety of rights from the right to economic welfare to a right 
to share in the social heritage of the country (Joppke, 2010; Stewart, 1995). Arguably, children 
were included in the conceptualisation and implementation of these social rights. However, 
their role was as part of the family and wider society, rather than in their own right as 
individuals with individual rights and interests as citizens. Indeed, in Marshall’s work there is 
no specific discussion about children’s citizenship rights.  
In contrast to this neglect of children in traditional conceptions of citizenship, studies 
of children’s agency demonstrate how children can be ‘active citizens, articulating their own 
values, perspectives, experiences and visions for the future, using these to inform and take 
action in their own right and, where necessary, contesting with those who have power over 
their lives’ (Percy-Smith and Thomas, 2010, p. 3). Lister (while critiquing Marshall) argues that 
children can be included as full citizens only through a ‘differentiated universalism’ in which 
being a citizen enables those historically marginalised from power to engage in ‘a struggle for 
recognition’ (Lister, 2007, pp. 709, 715).  Thus children must struggle first to be recognised as 
having capacity in law before they can start to develop their capabilities in society. The 
experiences of young people like Jake and the Tigere applicants, like those mobilizing for the 
DREAM Act in the US, are instances of developing legal capacity. Belonging and identity may 
be theirs but status remains elusive without this struggle.    
The Case Study: Registration of Children as British Citizens 
 
To explore the practice of nationality law in relation to children we gathered in-depth 
qualitative data from interviews with nine legal practitioners, observations at two law centres, 
and contributions made by 19 stakeholders in a focus-group style workshop on children’s 
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citizenship we organized in London in December 2015. Participation in our project was on 
condition that we would preserve anonymity and confidentiality of interviewees and those we 
observed, in line with ethical and data protection requirements. Outside this guarantee of 
individual anonymity, we agreed that it would be important and useful to talk about one 
specific research site. The Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens (PRCBC) is 
a registered charitable company currently supported by volunteer lawyers and volunteer 
paralegals. The project holds monthly Saturday sessions where the clients served are mainly 
children and their families who seek advice on registration and, in some cases, for regularising 
their immigration status. We observed such sessions to understand the kind of challenges that 
come up for children and their families in nationality cases. 
Our project data consistently highlights the precarious condition of children who are 
long term residents but not yet citizens. Such children generally acquire full British social 
identity but fail to obtain the corresponding secure legal status in the UK. In some instances 
despite acquiring a secure legal status they are unable to fully enjoy their legal rights. Due to 
family migration reasons or lack of individual full citizenship status, many are unable to enjoy 
uninterrupted stay within the country. They have restricted access to higher education and are 
unable to enjoy free movement within the European Economic Area, in a manner that other 
British children are normally accustomed. Corresponding to this insecurity experienced by 
children in nationality legal practice is the lack of coherent legal reasoning on children’s rights. 
Registration as a legal process of gaining nationality introduces many elements of 
uncertainty for children. There is a lack of awareness of the law and lack of understanding of 
its technical requirements. A range of factors influence decision making and children lack 
clarity about these as well as about their own roles in the legal procedures. Uncertainty is also 
11 
 
connected to a sense of helplessness as there is little scope for children to participate and to 
be heard by decision makers in the nationality processes. Thus they are rendered into passive 
subjects of the law.  
Practitioners experience very different approaches to the wellbeing of children in 
family law custody cases than in nationality cases. Requirements of ‘good character’ and 
scrutiny of the applicant’s immigration history are used for deciding these cases.  As Anderson 
has written in her book Us and Them (2013) there is an ethos of the ‘community of value’ which 
liberal democracies project as important for their socio-political make-up. Legal provisions, 
thus, aim to separate out the potential ‘good’ citizens from the ‘bad’ ones. The ‘good’ subject 
will be able to join the ‘community of value’ while the ‘bad’ ones are potential liabilities or risk 
becoming ‘failed’ citizens whose citizenship may have to be later cancelled.  
This framework for assessment of adult conduct and worthiness is superimposed on 
children to measure children’s suitability, despite obvious differences in life situations between 
children and adults. Thus, the Home Secretary currently applies the same good conduct criteria 
to children as she does for adults in nationality cases. To further complicate matters, children 
are rendered passive in nationality matters through a lack of specific reasoning about their 
wellbeing and a failure to hear their voices in nationality legal proceedings. In their private 
relations the wellbeing of children is part and parcel of domestic British legal reasoning through 
the ‘welfare principle’ in family law.  In family law cases the voice of the child is heard by judges 
either directly, by talking to children, or indirectly, through experts who seek to gauge what 
would be in their best interest. Domestic legal provisions state that the interests of children 
are of ‘paramount consideration’. In nationality cases, however, there are competing 
considerations such as sovereignty of the nation state in determining membership of its own 
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citizenry. Public considerations of security, law and order often act as countervailing forces in 
determinations of nationality. British citizenship also has its own peculiar institutional 
character shaped by historical processes that renders it inaccessible to children in practice.  
Nationality cases are about documenting and assessing the migration records of the 
family rather than analyzing the welfare of children in a specific manner. The other connections 
that children have in British society such as their schools, clubs, activities, and relations of 
friendship and mentorship are rarely part of deliberations in nationality applications made by 
children. In this manner, children are confined to being part of the family unit and not given 
separate consideration as autonomous individuals in their own rights.  While being considered 
part and parcel of their family, they are not heard in the manner that they are in family law 
cases (such as in custody cases). The law thus places them in a state of maximum passivity in 
nationality cases. 
The Law in the Books  
 
In 1910, Roscoe Pound wrote a seminal article titled Law in Books and Law in Action in 
the American Law Review. Through this distinction between the law as set out formally and as 
experienced by people, Pound introduced realist jurisprudence and advocated for the use of 
sociological evidence of the operation of law in society. In our case study, as well, ‘law in the 
books’ is quite distinct from ‘law in action’. We have mentioned that the law in the books 
provides for the inclusion of children who are long term residents in the UK. However, in 
practice there is widespread uncertainty about the law and its application to children. For 
adults, the most common route to acquire citizenship is naturalization. Children have to wait 
until they step into adulthood before they can naturalize and as a result lose many precious 
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years.  Registration becomes their default option and they can seek this through entitlement 
or through executive discretion.  
Registration by entitlement applies to someone born in the UK, who has lived 
continuously in the UK from the time of his or her birth until their tenth birthday. But 
entitlement does not mean guaranteed citizenship as there is still a requirement to establish 
‘good character’ (under Section 1(4) of the BNA 1981). The process of sorting out potential 
applicants who can contribute to the ‘community of value’ is reflected in the requirements of 
‘good character’ (Anderson 2013). ‘Good character’ has become an important criterion for 
registering children over the age of ten. This policy was introduced in 2006 before being 
enshrined in statute (Section 41A BNA) in 2010. This means even registration by entitlement is 
uncertain for children above the age of ten.  
Registration by discretion covers children who do not fulfil all the criteria specified for 
entitlement. Normally, for children not born in the UK, it takes a long time to qualify (currently 
11 years). The discretionary route is, in theory, broad and inclusive as the Home Secretary can 
potentially consider all kinds of differently situated children through this provision. However, 
as we shall see, in practice these provisions are interpreted and applied very narrowly, and 
many children are barred from accessing citizenship rights. 
The Law in Action 
 
Through the law in the books there is potential for inclusion of children as citizens. In 
practice, however, the pathway to citizenship has become increasingly arduous for most 
children. Restrictive changes in immigration policies and rules mean that fewer children 
directly qualify for settled status. Accessible legal advice and assistance for children seeking to 
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register as British citizens is quite rare owing to legal aid cuts from 1 April 2013. In a recent 
report, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Examination of the Fifth Periodic Report of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the UK Children’s Commissioners 
have found that there is severe impact of systematic reductions in legal advice for children and 
their carers in immigration and nationality matters. Pro bono legal advisers at the PRCBC, for 
instance, receive an increasing number of enquiries from children on the pathways to 
citizenship, but can only assist a very limited number of these children as they currently have 
no funds; all work is being done solely on a pro bono basis.  
Owing to their circumstances, children are often forced into the discretionary route for 
citizenship applications. In these applications, the settlement status of the child’s parents is 
considered important as it is used to gauge whether their ‘future clearly lies in the UK’. Case 
workers and legal advisers are unsure how any past indiscretions by the child or their parents 
would affect their applications. Case workers, thus tend to be over-cautious and pre-empt 
applications (sometimes wrongly) if they think that there is less likelihood of success. This kind 
of pre-screening is an effect of a very strict interpretation of the legislation and reflects similar 
restrictive interpretations by the Home Secretary. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases before 
the PRCBC, the child concerned has lived for several years in Britain, fully intends to reside in 
the UK in the future, and has a clear British identity. Nevertheless, many fail in their 
discretionary applications. The reasons provided for refusal are often generic, superficial, and 
not based on the assessment of the individual circumstances of each case.  
Danny, 18, has lived in the UK since the age of three. His case is illustrative of the factual 
circumstances of several PRCBC clients. Danny was not directly entitled to citizenship as his 
father was not settled in the UK and his mother had returned to her country of birth. The Home 
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Secretary had the discretion to register children as British citizens but refused Danny’s 
application without proper consideration and without providing adequate reasons. The PRCBC 
challenged the Home Secretary’s decision in the High Court, but rather than fighting the case, 
the Home Secretary settled it out of court and registered Danny as British. Jake, mentioned in 
the epigraph to this article, is another example for whom legal advice became of critical 
importance. In the guidelines there was nothing that preventing Jake from applying for 
discretionary registration. But initial legal advice received by Jake, telling him to wait for 
naturalisation, was based on a very narrow reading of the guidelines. Later, while explaining 
that a favourable outcome was uncertain, the PRCBC advised him to make a discretionary 
application for registration. Waiting for naturalisation would place his life on hold while he 
would be unable to pursue higher education. Discretionary registration, on the other hand, 
would enable him to continue on his track of excellence. Jake’s application was eventually 
successful and he has now started university. Nonetheless, the process of acquiring citizenship 
was unsettling for him and his family. 
Both Danny’s case and Jake’s case highlight the fact that most PRCBC clients are socially 
and culturally British even when they lack the legal paperwork to establish British citizenship. 
These children are high achieving with the clear potential to contribute to British society. Jake’s 
case also illustrates the skewed nature of legal advice which children receive because of a strict 
and narrow reading of policy guidance. Case workers often tailor their advice to reflect the 
known difficulties in acquiring citizenship and pre-empt applications because of the high 
application fees. Case workers are often wary of discretionary registration as the application 
fees are high and non-refundable. An application made by a child costs £749 at present. This 
fee is several times more than the cost to process the applications and there are no fee waivers 
for those children who are unable to afford this amount. A refusal is also difficult to challenge 
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as the Home Secretary often issues refusal letters without including full and adequate reasons 
for the refusal. Several letters received by PRCBC clients contain nearly identical reasons for 
rejection, suggesting a mechanical and bureaucratic approach to these applications.  
Statements such as ‘the child is not settled’ and ‘sufficient grounds to exercise discretion could 
not be found’ are frequently used in rejections of their application. However, without 
examining their best interests with reference to their individual life circumstances these 
reasons do not reflect the context of the lives of the children. As children are normally 
dependent on the family’s circumstances, their situations are not acknowledged separately. 
While it is true that to the extent that one is looking at whether the child’s future lies in the UK 
it is necessary to ascertain the situation of her or his family, this is just one factor in determining 
whether the child’s future is in the UK. 
Our case study findings indicate that there is a significant gap between law in the books 
and law in action in the area of children’s citizenship. This gap exists at various levels of 
knowledge, experience and practice. For instance, many children remain unaware of their 
insecure legal status for most of their lives. They believe they are already British citizens 
because they were born in the UK or have lived here from a very young age. Issues normally 
arise only when they decide to go on to further education or to go on a school trip abroad or 
in similar situations when they need documentation of their status.  
The most common scenario we encountered in lawyers’ offices is similar to the Tigere 
case and to the story of Jake in the epigraph to this article: at the time of applications for 
university education, the children and their families discover that the children have no secure 
right to remain in the UK and are not eligible for home student fees and student loans. 
Confusion is common as sometimes the children have a sibling who has British citizenship or a 
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parent with a secure status so the family presumes all the children hold British citizenship. 
Some parents mistake the registration of birth as evidence of citizenship. The children 
themselves strongly identify as British and most of them are deeply disturbed to find they are 
not British in law. This makes them feel uncomfortably different from their friends.  
While manifested most strongly in the area of university admissions for able children, 
there is also a general lack of awareness about the rights associated with citizenship and the 
need to register. Some parents are aware that the benefits of a child having British citizenship 
as opposed to indefinite leave to remain (settled status), or any other long-term status, is that 
citizenship gives the child full rights as a UK citizen. The child may not only obtain a British 
passport but also acquires the rights of a citizen of the European Union. Other statuses, such 
as Indefinite Leave to Remain, at most confer a right to remain without time restriction. 
However, generally when one parent acquires a right to remain, families tend to overlook the 
importance of a secure status for the child, presuming that the child is part of the family and 
automatically gains similar rights. Children who are looked after by local authorities also risk 
losing their right to apply to register as British citizens as local authorities often fail to take the 
necessary steps for these children to register as citizens.  
Returning to the triadic socio-legal lens of rights, status and identity, the nature of 
assessments of children’s registration exemplifies that lacking formal status should not hamper 
child development. The sense of belonging to British society and children’s self-identification 
with this country are also essential ingredients of citizenship. Using Cockburn’s (1998b) inter-
dependent approach to children’s citizenship, the many other links a child has to society - 
schools, friends, neighbours, community organisations and other networks - should also be 
given importance. Even when there is an assessment of a child’s best interests, at present this 
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does not properly include the child’s own wishes where these are ascertainable. This 
demonstrates the inability to think of children as autonomous beings, in the arena of 
nationality and citizenship, despite the developments in formal provisions of the law to respect 
this autonomy. 
 The child’s welfare is not engaged to the extent that it is in family law.  It is possible to 
argue that this is because the primary purpose of nationality cases is to determine who is, and 
who is not, a national and that is an exclusive area of national discretion. Yet the discretion in 
nationality matters is not wholly unrestricted and there are legal boundaries within which state 
discretion operates even for issues of nationality. Arbitrary denial of nationality or 
denationalisation is unlawful in international law. We suggest that in law, there is no conflict 
between formal membership of children and the rights of children as existing obligations 
towards the welfare of children are currently met in the legal provisions.  In theory the Home 
Secretary can give due consideration to a wide range of relevant factors while assessing the 
situation of children in their nationality applications. However, in practice, she rarely gives 
adequate consideration to the welfare of children while assessing their immigration profile and 
their potential for formal membership as citizens. Thus, her assessment falls short of the 
requirements in national and international legal instruments for the wellbeing of children. Such 
failure reveals much about the lack of concern for children’s position in society outside their 
immediate family circles. On the contrary, if the Home Secretary gives due consideration to 
the links of children in wider society (school life, clubs, hobbies and activities, friendships and 
mentoring by other adults) then formal membership will not be a barrier for children.  
Overall, it appears that the acquisition of British Nationality is a bureaucratic exercise 
designed with adults in mind. Adults are tested in their commitment to acquiring citizenship 
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by being made to commit time and resources to citizenship processes. This is supposed to be 
part of the social contract. The commitment to get over such challenges can serve to 
demonstrate that the candidate has earned his or her citizenship. However, this design cannot 
be adopted for children for whom full participation in British society is critical in the immediate 
present for their personal development. Their citizenship is the means to an end in achieving 
full participation rather than the other way around.  
Children’s Welfare in Family Law and Nationality Law 
 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) places the duty on all 
national institutions to consider the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in 
decision making (Article 3). The duty applies to all areas relevant for children and not just in 
matters close to family life. However, for several years the UNCRC had no application to 
immigration and nationality decisions because the United Kingdom had entered a specific 
reservation in that regard.  It is possible that the legacy of this reservation is, at least partly, 
responsible for the lack of welfare analysis in children’s nationality cases. 
 Recently, there has been a shift towards opening up nationality law to international 
child welfare obligations. The UK’s reservation was lifted in 2008 and Section 55 of the Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 was inserted in domestic law to reflect this change. 
Section 55 places a duty on the Home Secretary, immigration officers and customs officials to 
have due regard for the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children while 
performing any function in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality. The Immigration Act 
2014 in Section 71 also clarifies that it would not limit, in any way, duties regarding the welfare 
of children imposed on the Home Secretary or any other person by Section 55 of the Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The development of domestic law, at least in the books, 
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now aligns with international law and promotes children’s wellbeing in nationality and 
citizenship matters as it does for family law. Domestic legislation is now also in conformity with 
the case law on nationality from the International Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights. The European Court in the Genovese case, (Application no. 53124/09, 11 
November 2011), and the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case, (Liechtenstein 
v Guatemala) [1955] ICJ 1, have both emphasized the importance of nationality. The Genovese 
case sets out that the (access to) nationality falls within the scope of protection of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as part of a person’s social identity, which in 
turn is part of that person’s private life. The Nottebohm case underlines the importance of 
effective connection in determining nationality so it attaches critical importance to identity as 
a part of nationality. Potentially, states have to show use of greater judgment and 
consideration while conferring or removing nationality from children than for adults. Despite 
these developments in law, however, our data indicates there has been no perceptible change 
in decision making in nationality applications made by children. The decisions continue to 
neglect the analysis of the rights and interests of children while considering their migration 
history and family situations.  
 The scenario in private family law matters is quite different as the welfare of children 
and their rights are discussed frequently and copiously. For example, in the context of custody 
of children, the UK Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the best interest 
of the child has to be considered in the context of the merits of each individual case (In re K (A 
Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] UKSC 29;- In re L (A 
Child) (Custody: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) 
[2013] UKSC 75; Re A (Children) (Jurisdiction: Return of Child) [2013] UKSC 60 and In re LC 
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(Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] UKSC 1) ).There is 
no nationality domestic case with a similar focus on best interests of children.   
Perhaps, the only way the wellbeing of children has entered into nationality cases is the 
merging of nationality and family law issues. For example, in ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 
4 the Supreme Court scrutinized removal from the UK of the mother of British citizen children 
in relation to interference with the children’s right for respect of their family life (Article 8 
ECHR).  The poor immigration history of the mother came up in the case. The mother had made 
several false applications to the UK Border Agency, including some claiming asylum. Twice she 
used a false ID. The basis in which her children were British was through their British citizen 
father. In 2005 the couple separated and sometime after that the mother, who was the 
children’s primary carer, was threatened with removal from the UK. This raised a quandary 
about the children’s family situation. As well as being British citizens, the children had spent all 
their lives in the UK. Thus, they had no other relevant national identity. The confluence of 
nationality law and family life in this case led the court to consider in detail the wellbeing of 
the children.  
In ZH, when considering the mother’s poor immigration history, the court clarified that 
a child should not be held responsible for the acts or omissions of her or his parents. Lady Hale 
said: ‘in making the proportionality assessment under Article 8, the best interests of the child 
must be a primary consideration. This means they must be considered first. They can, of course 
be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations’ (para. 33). The point to be 
noted here is that while Lady Hale called ‘best interests’ a primary consideration, her analysis 
presents it only as one of several factors to be balanced. Her fellow Supreme Court judge, Lord 
Kerr however elevated the status of the best interests of the child higher in the same judgment.  
He asserted that a child’s best interests ‘must rank higher than any other. It is not merely one 
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consideration that weighs in the balance alongside other competing factors. Where the best 
interests of the child clearly favour a certain course, that course should be followed unless 
countervailing reasons of considerable force displace them. It is not necessary to express this 
in terms of a presumption but the primacy of this consideration needs to be made clear in 
emphatic terms. What is determined to be in a child’s best interests should customarily dictate 
the outcome of cases such as the present, therefore, and it will require considerations of 
substantial moment to permit a different result’ (para. 46).  
In ZH, the core agreement on best interests with regards to the British citizenship of 
the children, is reflected in Lady Hale’s words, ‘Although nationality is not a “trump card” it is 
of particular importance in assessing the best interests of any child’ (Lady Hale, para. 30). 
Further, ZH (Tanzania) highlighted the need for the decision maker to endeavour to ascertain 
the views of the child (in accordance with Article 12 UNCRC). Right after ZH (Tanzania), another 
judgment in the case of R (Tinizaray) v SSHD [2011] EWHC Admin (Admin) confirmed the role 
which the best interest principle must play. HH Judge Anthony Sultan QC writes in Tinizaray 
that nationality is of particular importance, since deportation would deprive that child of her 
country of origin and the protection and support that she has acquired socially, culturally and 
medically from growing up in a British lifestyle, and would also lead to a social and linguistic 
disruption and a loss of educational opportunities. It needs to be clarified here that Tinizaray 
was not considered a precedent which lays down general principles of law in the subsequent 
Court of Appeal in SS (Nigeria) v SSHD[2013] EWCA Civ 550 (Laws LJ at [55]) and thus has less 
value as a precedent as compared to the ZH case. In Zoumbas v SSHD [2013] UKSC 74; there 
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were very young children involved who had  not stayed long enough in the UK but  in para. 10 
the judges discussed the importance of the best interests of children. 1  
Taken together with legislative changes however these new developments seem to 
indicate that the welfare of the child is of paramount concern in matters relating to nationality 
and immigration. Yet, this context does not permeate into the decisions about the registration 
of children as British citizens because the Home Office is generally resistant to the idea that 
British citizenship, over and above some form of subsidiary leave, is necessarily in the best 
interests of the child. In decision after decision, the Home Office fails to refer to best interests 
of the children or their welfare while providing reasons for rejecting their citizenship 
applications. The Home Office has downplayed the importance of acquiring citizenship over 
and above a secure ‘leave to remain’ immigration status. In FI, R (on the application of) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 2287 (Admin) the Home Office 
argued that a child (a 16 year old who had lived in the UK since the age of seven) had already 
been granted Indefinite Leave to Remain, and failing to register as a citizen would not affect 
his right to live or study in the UK, nor would it affect his everyday life (para. 14). For this reason, 
claimed the Home Secretary, the boy’s best interests had already been taken into account, and 
the decision to refuse registration was based on the fact that his best interests would ‘lie with 
his family but not to the detriment of current nationality legislation’. The court found this 
reasoning flawed and held that this was a failure by the Home Secretary to properly have 
                                                          
1 See also HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 
25 and Norris v Government of United States of America [2010] UKSC 9 [best 




regard to the best interests of the boy. The court acknowledged that, although the practical 
impact of registering the boy as a British citizen may be marginal, ‘it is wrong to treat the 
decision as having no impact on his best interests’ (para. 22). Thus the ‘best interest’ standard 
has been interpreted by the courts as requiring the Home Secretary to consider more than just 
simply whether the child can continue to live with his or her family. Instead, the door is left 
open for considering possible future benefits in terms of education and employment, and 
perhaps also the ‘intangible’ or symbolic benefits of British citizenship for children.  
 
Critique and Alternative Framework 
 
We have highlighted through our case study of registration how law in action fails to 
address the rights of children. In our case study children are rendered doubly passive by their 
minority status and lack of legal status as citizens. Although their rights are often assumed to 
be those enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Alanen, 2010) they cannot 
enforce these unless the passivity is unmasked. The presence of domestic legislation reinforces 
the belief that the needs of children are already taken into account but, unless children acquire 
the status of citizenship, how these play out for different children may be mediated through 
their nationality pathways. Their rights are affected by their status.  
Further, case workers and social workers tend to focus on their conduct and the status 
and conduct of their parents rather than their other community associations. This may be for 
two reasons: first, children are considered as indivisible from other family interests; and 
second, liberal rights systems focus more on individual rights than community relationships so 
the family is the widest extension of individual rights that usually fits in with this schema. This 
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view makes it difficult to account for the complexities of human relationships. Children do form 
parts of families but when the families come from elsewhere they also form part of different 
communities (Cockburn, 1998a and b).  
Even the Tigere case [2015] UKSC 57 which emphasised the right to education without 
discrimination for all children who are residing (lawfully for over three years) in the UK did so 
without analysis of the best interests of children; instead the court looks at adverse effects on 
the lives of young people. For example, Lady Hale cites Alison East, of the Coram Children’s 
Legal Centre, in para. 9: ‘Our experience … suggests that young people find not being able to 
go to university, when that would be a natural educational progression alongside their peers, 
incredibly difficult. They have worked hard to do well at school and at college, and aspire to 
achieve the best they can. … Seeing their friends and peers go to university when they cannot, 
and being aware of being held back for as long as ten years in pursuing qualifications that are 
essential in a competitive job market, inevitably causes these young people to feel 
marginalised. … They feel that it is deeply unfair as they are not asking for a grant of money 
but only to be loaned the money which will allow them to progress, alongside their peers, into 
well-paid work so that they can pay that loan back.’ This discussion provides a realistic view 
into the lives of the young people in general but this is not the same as carrying out a best 
interest assessment for each individual child affected by a nationality decision. 
The law fails to treat children differently from adults and consider their special needs. 
This prompts us to reconsider the existing framework and suggest an alternative framework 
for children’s citizenship. We submit that legal gaps exist because there is still a failure to 
actualise the rights of children. As we have seen, in nationality cases the focus is on legal status 
rather than on rights or on identity and belonging whereas all of these constitute citizenship. 
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A best interest assessment should ideally look at all aspects of status, identity and rights as all 
relate to child development. If the best interest standard is applied both in letter and in spirit 
in nationality cases then children who identify as British and have been here in their formative 
years will be able to acquire the status and enjoy citizenship rights. This is in line with the 
general trend in more inclusive status approaches in nationality laws. After all, in the past the 
dominant image of ‘the citizen’ was that of a property owning adult male. Later this changed 
to include all adult males, then to women above a certain age (usually above an age threshold 
higher than for men) and finally to include all adults (Turner, 1993). In recent times there has 
been recognition of inequalities which can be perpetuated by nationality laws, such as linking 
citizenship to legitimacy of birth or linking citizenship with gender. These have been corrected 
by Parliament. Therefore shifts in societal perceptions about role, identity and rights do bring 
about shifts in law. But despite the progress in issues related to the rights of children, children’s 
citizenship rights still lie at the periphery of notions of citizenship.  
Conclusion 
 
In this article we have demonstrated that children are marginalised in traditional 
understandings of citizenship. This is puzzling as theoretically it is easiest to agree about the 
citizenship rights of children who are long term residents.  Assessing their best interests in the 
processes for acquiring citizenship is important so that children who belong to the UK socially 
and culturally are not held back by any bureaucratic or punitive approach to the acquisition of 
their legal citizenship.  
For this purpose, in this paper we develop a re-conceptualisation of children’s 
citizenship rights by borrowing from the robust approach to the welfare of children and 
children’s participation in family law cases. As we have seen in family law cases the best 
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interests of children have become of central importance. Cases such as ZH (Tanzania) have 
brought best interests into nationality matters as well, but this is only because of the specific 
circumstances of the case which places it at the intersection of family and nationality law.  
Otherwise, children are yet to find their voice in nationality cases. Such a divergence in 
approaches to children in family matters and nationality matters is without any clear rationale. 
After all, citizenship is not just about the legal status that ties the citizen to the state; it is also 
about the social cement that binds citizens to each other, developing a community of people. 
Children who share cultural and social national characteristics are part of the social cement. 
Having spent their formative years in a country, they are citizens in every respect but for not 
having completed the process of registration for bureaucratic reasons.  
If the best interests of the child is not the paramount criterion in registration cases then 
children’s rights are not fully protected. While looking at where the ‘future clearly lies’ of a 
child, if the many social and cultural factors which connect the child to British society are not 
considered, the role of children and adults as interdependent in society is not acknowledged. 
Further, if requirements of good character are included, these introduce wide discretion into 
citizenship pathways and bring in elements of uncertainty for children. The use of wide 
discretion means children do not even reach the application stage in many instances. In this 
manner children’s right to acquire the most secure status of citizenship is diluted.  
Children’s rights are now better protected than ever before, but there is still a long way 
to go in terms of citizenship rights. We can see in the PRCBC case study, the best interests of 
children are still side-lined in practice or limited through interpretation of the law. There is no 
real recognition of the interdependence of adults and children in nationality laws and cases. 
Best interest assessment has not yet achieved a central role in nationality cases despite the 
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dynamic progression of case law. In practice, there are serious problems with the process for 
registering children as British citizens. Having their citizenship status determined in their best 
interests would enable them to participate more fully in British society. It would nurture a 
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